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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
With the unresolved debt crisis, the uncertainty surrounding the euro area economy is particularly 
acute this winter. This fact was nicely summarised by Olivier Blanchard (2011): 
‘... [P]ost the 2008-09 crisis, the world economy is pregnant with multiple equilibria—self-fulfilling 
outcomes of pessimism or optimism, with major macroeconomic implications.’ 
Because of this uncertainty, in preparing this outlook for the euro area economy using NIESR’s NiGEM 
world model, we have considered three different scenarios. In the central forecast we see the EU 
“muddling through” the crisis, with current levels of uncertainty about debt sustainability persisting 
through to the middle of the year. The recapitalisation of the EU banking system will also exercise a 
negative effect on growth in the first half of 2012. On the basis of these assumptions there would be no 
growth in output in the euro area this year, with a return to limited growth of only 1.4% in 2013 (Table 
1).  
Table 1: Summary of Forecast for GDP in different scenarios 
 2011 2012 2013 
Central Forecast 1.7 0.0 1.4 
Upside scenario 1.7 0.8 1.8 
Downside scenario 1.7 -2.1 -1.2 
 
The second, more pessimistic (downside) scenario, models the effects of a further deepening of the 
crisis if the current uncertainty about the sustainability of government debt continued until the end of 
2012. Such an outcome could result in a fall in GDP in 2012 of just over 2% and a further fall in 2013 of 
just over 1%. 
The third upside scenario models the effect of ‘decisive action’ that might be taken by European policy 
makers in the immediate future, which could rapidly shock the markets out of the current mood of 
pessimism and uncertainty and see a return of confidence in the ability of the euro area governments to 
meet forthcoming debt obligations. Under this scenario GDP could grow by 0.8% this year followed by 
growth of 1.8% next year. 
The major tightening in fiscal policy that is occurring across the euro area is inevitably having a 
substantial negative effect on output. This report suggests that this fiscal policy stance may result in 
growth in 2012 being between 0.8% and 1.3% lower than it would otherwise be. For 2013 the negative 
impact of announced fiscal policy measures could be to reduce growth by between 0.6% and 1.1%.  
The travails of the banking system and the requirement for recapitalisation over the next six months 
will have a very significant impact on the EU economy in 2012. On the basis of our assumptions, the 
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NiGEM model simulations suggest that this factor could reduce the rate of growth in GDP in the euro 
area by around 0.8 percentage points. This estimate is included in our forecast scenarios. 
This report is rather different from previous EUROFRAME forecasts produced over the last decade. On 
this occasion the major uncertainty in the forecast arises from the stance of domestic policy within the 
euro area, not from external factors. Because of this uncertainty we have focused on three different 
scenarios for 2012 and 2013 rather than concentrating on a single “likely” forecast, as was usual in the 
past. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the world economy is changing rapidly. Today increased 
uncertainty is a fundamental feature of the economy. This fact was nicely summarised by Blanchard 
(2011): 
‘... [P]ost the 2008-09 crisis, the world economy is pregnant with multiple equilibria—self-fulfilling 
outcomes of pessimism or optimism, with major macroeconomic implications.’ 
With the unresolved debt crisis, the debates in certain countries about the break-up of the European 
Union, and the negotiations on the new Treaty in full motion, this winter the uncertainty surrounding 
the euro area economy is particularly acute. While we view any collapse in the euro area as being 
extremely unlikely, there are a number of other scenarios, or “equlibria” as Blanchard terms them, 
which are possible. Depending on the response of policy-makers and how consumer and financial 
market confidence develops, the euro area could return to recession or could claw its way back to 
growth over the coming year. 
In this context, it is extremely challenging to provide a comprehensive outlook for the euro area. The 
task requires the analysis of these ‘multiple equilibria’. Therefore, the approach behind the outlook 
presented in this report, was to use NIESR’s NiGEM model to develop a central forecast, characterised 
as “muddling through” the crisis and two other scenarios which represent more optimistic and more 
pessimistic outcomes. The more pessimistic or downside scenario attempts to model the effects of a 
further deepening of the crisis as uncertainty continues unabated until the end of 2012. The upside 
scenario, aims to capture the effects of some possible ‘decisive action’ that might be taken by European 
policy makers, which would shock the markets out of the current mood of pessimism and uncertainty 
and see a return of confidence in the ability of the euro area governments to meet forthcoming debt 
obligations without difficulty. 
Three factors are contributing to the current slowdown or recession in the euro area. The major rise in 
oil prices in 2010-11 has been a dampener on growth. The major tightening in fiscal policy that is 
occurring across the euro area is inevitably having a substantial negative effect on output. The travails 
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of the banking system and the requirement for recapitalisation over the next six months will have a 
much wider impact on the economy, not just for the euro area, but also for the EU as a whole. This 
report gives special attention to the last two of these factors. The fiscal tightening is dealt with in 
section 8 and the bank recapitalisation in section 9. While we do not analyse the impact of the high oil 
price in this report, Barrell, Delannoy and Holland (2011), in a study using the NiGEM model, find that 
a $20 rise in the price of oil can be expected to reduce GDP growth in the euro area by about 0.5%.  
The current background to our forecast is discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 of this report we look at 
the global context facing the euro area over the coming two years and Section 4 gives more detailed 
consideration to the prospects for major world economies. Based on this external environment and the 
fiscal and monetary stance currently in place in the euro area, Section 5 sets out our central forecast 
where we see the euro area “muddling through” over the next year. Section 6 considers a downside 
scenario where the crisis deepens and ”muddling through” continues much longer, so that while the 
euro area survives intact, substantial additional damage is done to growth prospects. While it is 
possible for the euro area economy to seriously underperform, as in the downside scenario, it is also 
possible that more “decisive action” could see a serious recession being avoided with growth in GDP 
continuing through 2012 and accelerating in 2013. This upside or “decisive action” scenario is 
considered in Section 7. 
Even on conservative assumptions it is clear that the tightening of fiscal policy is an important factor in 
current developments in the euro area economy.  The negative impact of the current contractionary 
stance of fiscal policy in the euro area is assessed in Section 8. Section 9 provides a preliminary 
assessment of how the problems facing the EU banking system may be contributing to current woes. 
This is likely to be particularly important in the short-term development of the economy out to the 
summer of 2012. Finally, in Section 10 we summarise our results. 
2 OVERVIEW 
The world economy entered the year 2012 in a fragile state. As the Great Recession of 2008/9 ended in 
summer 2009, there was a significant rebound; however, it masked large differences in the growth rates 
of individual countries. Developing countries, particularly in Asia, managed to set their economies in 
motion more quickly than industrialised countries. In particular, growth in China was substantially 
stronger than in the developed economies. 
The worst crisis since the 1930s was turned around by an unusually strong and partly co-ordinated 
monetary and fiscal stimulus. As a result, by the third quarter of 2011, output in a number of 
industrialised countries, such as the US, Germany and France slightly exceeded or were close to the 
pre-crisis level. In the euro area, however, GDP remained 1.4% below its level in the second quarter of 
2008 (see Figure 1), and in winter 2011/12 the euro area is on the brink of a further recession. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of GDP in 2011 Q3 with GDP in 2008 Q2 in Selected Countries 
 
Source: OECD, ETLA. 
The Great Recession and the subsequent stimulus packages and support to the financial sector have 
increased the budget deficits and public debt to unprecedented levels. In some countries, the collapses 
of bubbles in the housing market have had a serious adverse impact on banking and public sector 
balances. In spite of the fact that output is below potential, precedence is being given to tightening 
fiscal policy because debt has accumulated to levels that the financial markets consider to be 
unsustainable. Monetary policy is, however, accommodative and unconventional measures are widely 
utilised. 
Since the last peak in output in December 2007, US economic growth has been at historically low levels. 
Employment growth has also been quite weak and in October 2011 the unemployment rate was only 
one percentage point below its peak in 2009. There are some positive signs, but large public sector 
imbalances, combined with political gridlock and the crisis in the euro area, are damaging confidence 
and slowing growth. Due to its high oil intensity, the US economy is affected by expensive crude oil 
more strongly than most other developed countries. 
In Japan, development of the economy was dominated by the triple catastrophe in March 2011, when 
the exceptional earthquake and a large tsunami brought about unprecedented devastation, which 
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included a nuclear catastrophe. Consequently, in spring 2011 economic activity was very weak, but 
when the reconstruction began, it started to recover strongly. 
The euro area drifted deep into a severe sovereign debt crisis in May 2010. Rescue operations in 2008-9 
succeeded in preventing a global depression, but growth remained weak and public finances 
deteriorated strongly. Markets started to price in increased risk and Greece, Ireland and Portugal had 
to be rescued, as financing of their deficits and rolling-over of their maturing debt became too 
expensive. On the other hand, German bond yields were driven down to very low levels as they served 
as a safe haven for investors. There were a number of policy actions aimed at calming the situation and 
erecting a firewall around the crisis countries. In spite of these actions, risk premiums on Italian and 
Spanish bonds rose as the crisis was transmitted in the autumn of 2010. Had the ECB not intervened in 
the markets, their risk premiums would probably have increased to critical levels. Some other countries 
have also felt some pressure. Many governments have been forced to introduce strong austerity 
measures to calm the markets, however, the upward pressure on yields remains strong. The financing 
situations of Italy and Spain will be a critical issue in the spring of 2012.  
In contrast to the stagnant development of industrial countries, the key developing country, China, 
grew rapidly. In spring of 2010, in order to cool its overheating economy, China changed its policy 
stance to restrictive, however, this winter its economic policy is easing. Inflation remained high, albeit 
below its peak last summer. Property markets and exports were cooling down. In December the central 
bank started to cut reserve requirements. As exports have weakened, the priority of the government 
has shifted from calming inflationary pressures to stabilizing growth with special focus on consumer 
demand. 
3 GLOBAL OUTLOOK 
Global economic activity slowed down considerably towards the end of 2011. Growth in the euro area 
lost momentum in the second and third quarters with a GDP growth of only 0.2%, compared to 0.8% q-
o-q growth in the first quarter. According to the Euro Growth Indicator, the euro area is on the brink of 
recession (EUROFRAME, 2012), and the fourth quarter Composite Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) 
indicated the worst quarter since the spring of 2009 (Markit Economics Limited, 2012). In the US, 
growth accelerated to 0.5% during the third quarter. Whereas the leading indicator of the OECD points 
to a slowdown (OECD, 2011), the fourth quarter PMI was at 53.9%, an increase of 1.4 percentage points 
over the third quarter reading. The strong recovery in emerging markets, which started in early 2009, 
also seems to be running out of steam. During the first three quarters of 2011, Chinese GDP grew by 
9.4% compared to 10.4% during the same period in 2010. The Manufacturing PMI and composite 
leading indicator (CLI) for China both point to a slowdown in economic activity during the fourth 
quarter (OECD, 2011). The PMI’s for other Asian countries also point to slower growth towards the end 
of 2011. Overall, figure 2 shows that while the Great Recession had a negative effect on industrial 
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production in both the developed countries and the emerging economies, at the end of 2011 it remains 
below its pre-crisis peak in industrialised countries in general, and the euro area in particular, and 
above it in the emerging economies. 
Figure 2: Comparison of Industrial Production with its peak in April 2008 
 
Source: OECD, IMF, CPB, ETLA. 
The negative feedback loop between the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the banking crisis and the 
political deadlock over fiscal policy in the US, are creating significant headwinds for the economy by 
depressing producer and consumer confidence, disrupting global trade and tightening credit 
conditions. So far, the results of consecutive summits of the European Council and euro area Heads of 
State or Government fell short of the public pledges that have been made to reassure the financial 
markets. During the first half of November, the interest rates on sovereign bonds showed a significant 
increase, not only in Italy and Spain but also in France and Belgium (figure 3). This was a clear sign that 
the financial markets were not convinced by the agreements made at the October summit. Credit rating 
agencies were also displeased and are increasingly concerned about the prospects for economic growth 
in the euro area. Furthermore, this showed that the crisis, which had started on a more limited scale in 
the periphery of Europe, has now reached Europe’s core.  
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Figure 3: 10-year Government Bond Yields in Selected Countries 
 
Source: Bloomberg, ETLA. 
The financial markets had hoped that the summit would provide the ‘big bazooka’ – for example, a 
significant increase of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), with which all liquidity 
problems could be solved. However, shortly after the summit concluded it turned out that the ‘big 
bazooka’ would be very difficult to achieve. This failure led to increased uncertainty, having a 
detrimental effect on the economy: spending on consumption halted and investment decisions were 
postponed or even cancelled. Because these effects occurred in many countries at the same time, world 
trade growth came to a standstill (see figure 4 below). Market uncertainty was also apparent in the 
equity markets, where the implied volatility (VIX for S&P500 and VSTOXX for Dow Jones) has been at 
an elevated level since August, albeit not as high as after the fall of Lehman Brothers. Also as a result of 
the uncertainty in the financial markets, capital costs for the non-financial corporate sector increased 
strongly, much more so in the euro area than in the US. On the eve of the December summit, 
Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s president Nicolas Sarkozy gave the impression that 
this time they would achieve a decisive breakthrough. At the summit, agreement was reached on 
stronger and binding budget surveillance, leveraging of the EFSF, additional resources for the IMF and 
an acceleration of the entry into force of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the successor of the 
EFSF. Positive market response, however, was again short-lived as the implementation of the 
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agreements, and in particular the proposed increase in EFSF guarantees, turned out to be more 
problematic than it was previously thought.  
In general, during 2011 the ECB policy has been accommodative. Interest rate increases earlier in the 
year have been reversed as circumstances changed. Liquidity supply has been ample, especially 
towards the end of the year, when the ECB decided on additional enhanced credit support measures to 
strengthen bank lending and liquidity in the euro area money markets. To avoid a lack of collateral, the 
list of eligible collateral has temporarily been expanded. In December the newly introduced LTRO met 
a large demand of almost €490 billion for its three year loans against a fixed rate of 1%. Participating 
banks can use these loans to increase lending to households and businesses but they can also buy 
sovereign debt from distressed euro area states.1 The current strain in bank funding is one of the main 
reasons for the introduction of this type of non-standard measure by the ECB. 
There was hope that with a political agreement at the December summit on stronger and binding 
budget surveillance, the ECB would be able to take a more active part in the solution of the crises. Until 
now the ECB has, however, resisted political pressure to step up direct intervention in government 
bond markets. 
According to the OECD figures, government debt in the US (as a percentage of GDP) surpassed the 
euro area debt in 2010. Political gridlock about the debt ceiling and a near sovereign default at the end 
of July made the S&P downgrade the US rating from AAA to AA+. In November, after the deal on the 
debt ceiling was passed, the cross-party super committee started to negotiate budgetary savings of 
USD 1.2 trillion over 10 years, but failed to reach an agreement. This failure will trigger automatic cuts 
in defence and domestic spending over the 10 years from 2013. Negotiations about a one year extension 
of payroll tax cuts and unemployment insurance failed too. Eventually, a compromise deal on 
extending these stimulus measures for two months passed the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. Negotiations over a full year extension will resume in January. 
Figure 4 below shows that the spectacular recovery in world trade that started in 2009 has run out of 
steam during 2011. Leading indicators point to a small decline in the fourth quarter of 2011. The trade 
slowdown is especially acute in the developed economies as a result of the increased uncertainty in 
financial markets, budget austerity in various countries, and high oil prices. At the same time, imports 
into emerging economies are slowing down because of monetary tightening and capacity constraints. 
For 2011 as a whole, this implies an increase in world trade of almost 6% after a surge of 15% in 2010. 
  
                                                     
1 In this way the LTRO could act as the ‘big bazooka’ from the ECB as described by Christian Noyer, France’s central bank 
governor.  
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Figure 4: Level of World Trade, Three Month Moving Average: 2000 = 100 
 
Source: CPB World Trade Monitor 
After a period of relative stability in credit standards of loans to non-financial corporations (NFCs) and 
households (loans for house purchases and consumer credit), there was a significant net tightening of 
standards by euro area banks in the third quarter of 2011 (ECB, 2011). In the fourth quarter of 2011, 
banks expected a further net tightening of credit standards to NFCs. The tightening of credit standards 
for households is expected to be limited. The tightening of credit standards is closely linked to the re-
intensification of the sovereign debt crisis that undermined the perceived soundness of banks. The 
Bank Lending Survey indicates that the deterioration of funding conditions was one of the key factors 
behind tightening of credit standards. Two other indicators, the Euribor/OIS-spread and the spread of 
financials bond yields over government bond yields, also point to increasing bank funding problems as 
they both showed significant increases during 2011. The Euribor/OIS-spread, a measure of banks’ 
reluctance to lend to one another, rose in December to its highest point in 2½ years and the spread of 
financials over governments bonds has shown a large increase since April. These bank funding strains 
were one of the main arguments for the ECB to introduce the three year LTRO. 
The financial crisis is hurting individual countries in the euro area in different ways. With an average 
GDP growth of 0.2% in the third quarter of 2011, growth in the individual countries ranged from -0.4% 
(in Portugal) to 0.9% (in Finland). Unemployment rates also showed a wide range, from 4.0% (in 
Austria) to 22.9% (in Spain) (November 2011figures). 
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Leading indicators suggest that growth will be subdued, at least in the first half of 2012. Higher 
unemployment and deleveraging by households and firms will continue to depress aggregate demand 
for some time to come. Public sector consolidation programs will also put downward pressure on 
demand. This time governments in many advanced economies have no means to neutralise a huge fall 
in private sector demand. Nevertheless, in the central scenario it is assumed that governments have the 
means and the determination to prevent destructive events, such as disorderly sovereign defaults or 
systemic bank failures. As a result it is assumed in the central forecast that a serious depression is 
avoided. In this ‘muddling through’ scenario the situation in the financial markets is assumed to 
improve during the second half of 2012, leading to greater confidence and a pick-up in growth rates.  
Inflation accelerated rather strongly in 2010-11, when commodity prices rebounded sharply from their 
lows in the recession of 2008/9. Commodity prices first reacted to the strong demand from China and 
other commodity-intensive emerging economies, which recovered from the recession quickly. 
Emerging economies, and China in particular, have a big impact on commodity prices as their share in 
commodity demand has risen markedly by the early 2000s, and their growth rates, especially in 
commodity-intensive industrial production, are very strong. The recovery in industrialised countries, 
albeit weak, also supported the rise of the commodity prices  
Consumer price inflation in November 2011 varied from -0.2% in Japan to 3.4% in the US, 4.2% in 
China and 4.8% in the UK. In the euro area, consumer prices rose by 3%. In most countries, inflation is 
expected to decelerate due to weak economic growth and lower commodity prices. 
Energy prices dominate the changes in inflation in the euro area (see figure 5). Crude oil affects 
inflation directly through oil product prices and also indirectly by affecting other energy prices and the 
prices of energy-intensive products and services. During the Recession, oil prices (Brent) declined 
below USD 40 per barrel, but recovered quickly once the turnaround in emerging economies was 
apparent. The crude price rose rather rapidly to around USD 95 by the beginning of the 2011 when the 
political risks in North Africa and Middle East intensified. Oil prices peaked at around USD 125 in 
April when the Libyan crisis developed into a civil war. Libyan production practically ceased until 
October 2011 when the civil war ended. Since October, the price has been fluctuating around USD 110 
per barrel. Although the economic outlook has deteriorated the price was supported by, among other 
factors, Iran-related risks. The effect of energy on inflation, however, has passed its peak and, in the 
absence of new geopolitical shocks, it will quickly moderate even if prices stay high due to the base 
effect. 
Rapidly increasing food prices had a big effect on inflation around the world, especially in the 
emerging economies where the share of food in consumption is large. Rises in the prices of wheat and 
coffee have been very strong. Figure 5 shows that in the euro area, food inflation has been clearly faster 
than the headline inflation. The effect of food on consumer prices has been rather strong this winter, 
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but as in the case of energy, its impact has probably peaked already, provided that the forthcoming 
harvests are normal. Even though in China food prices had already reached a peak, they rose by 8.8% 
in November 2011 and added to consumer inflation by 2.7 percentage points. 
Figure 5: Euro Area Harmonised Inflation by Main Groups 
 
Source: Eurostat. CPB, ETLA 
In contrast to energy and food prices, core inflation, i.e. inflation excluding energy, food, alcohol and 
tobacco, has been stable and relatively low. In the euro area, even core inflation has accelerated slightly 
in recent months but it was still only 1.6% in November 2011. Sharp increases in commodity prices 
have affected the prices of energy-intensive products and services but they did not induce strong 
secondary effects. In industrialised countries wage pressures have remained modest as capacity 
utilisation has not normalised after the recession and unemployment rates are generally high.  
Moderate core inflation, together with weak growth and a fairly bleak economic outlook have kept 
central banks in the industrialised countries cautious. The US Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of 
England and the Bank of Japan have different mandates. The Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and 
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the Bank of England have kept their steering rates low and they have actively utilised so-called 
quantitative easing to support the functioning of money markets according to their policy goals. In the 
euro area, the steering rate was unexpectedly raised by 0.25 percentage points on two occasions in 
April and in July. In November, the rate was decreased by 0.25 percentage points, with a further 0.25 
percentage point cut in December. The ECB has also utilised unconventional measures to support 
banks’ liquidity. A Security Market Program was established in May 2010 to support the euro area 
financial system by buying government bonds of countries facing special stress. It has helped keep the 
government yields of the crisis countries in check. The most recent measure was to allow banks to 
access unlimited three-year financing from the central bank in order to ease pressures to trim their 
balance sheets.  
The euro exchange rate has been rather volatile reflecting expectations of the relative developments of 
the euro area vis-à-vis other currency areas. During the euro crisis, the euro strengthened against the 
dollar until May 2011, but has since weakened. Between summer 2010 and autumn 2011 the USD 
weakened steadily vis-à-vis the Chinese renminbi, and the price of the euro in yuans has fluctuated 
rather strongly, with a weakening trend in recent months. In the immediate future the Chinese central 
bank may be reluctant to let the renminbi appreciate further as domestic inflationary pressures are 
diminishing and the growth of Chinese exports has declined. 
4 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
4.1 China 
Indicators of the current situation in the Chinese economy point not only towards a slowdown in 
economic activity but also towards a decrease in the inflation rate. Industrial production growth in y-o-
y terms is almost 10 percentage points lower than in the first half of 2011. The December level of the 
Purchasing Manager Index was under 50 (the threshold between growth and contraction) for the 
second month in a row, suggesting more difficulties in the future. Furthermore, export performance is 
poor in comparison to early 2011, but it is still at approximately 9% y-o-y (and thus very far from the 
sharp decline in 2009). The trade surplus is also shrinking. Trade and exchange rate disputes with the 
US (e.g. recent measures against US car imports) add concerns about trade developments in the coming 
quarters. However, facilitated by the 2010 free-trade-agreement with ASEAN, a certain amount of trade 
re-orientation towards Asian markets is already taking place. Domestic consumption continued to 
grow at a buoyant pace of approximately of 17% y-o-y, with a slight acceleration in real terms due to 
the reduction in the inflation rate.  
At the moment, the decline in economic activity is not comparable with that of the early stages of the 
great recession and policymakers have room to prevent rapid worsening. After a period of tightening, 
monetary policy could now be reversed and, given a more acceptable inflation rate since October, fiscal 
policy also has the room for expansionary measures.  
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In the case of sudden deflation in the housing market and the construction sector, or further 
deterioration in global demand, the risk is of a more severe slowdown. 
4.2 United States 
In the third quarter of 2011, the US economy expanded further after the very weak performance at the 
beginning of the year (0.4%, 1.3% and 1.8% annualised growth in the first, second and third quarters, 
respectively). The expansion was driven by strong private consumption, and fixed non-residential 
investments. However, residential investment remained weak, and inventories had a negative impact 
on GDP growth. 
Despite the recent positive signs in the labour market (in December the unemployment rate declined to 
8.5% and jobless claims fell more than expected), this recovery is characterised by a much weaker 
labour market than in previous episodes, with rising long-term unemployment and a steady exit of 
discouraged workers from the labour market. This adversely affects households who remain in a 
vulnerable position because they need further balance sheet corrections and continue to suffer from the 
negative wealth effects, due to the adverse developments in the financial markets. 
Equity prices dropped by approximately 6% in the second half of 2011 according to S&P 500 index, 
and, according to the Case-Shiller index based on the data from 20 cities, house prices are still 30% 
lower than they were in the pre-crisis peak. Corporate borrowing spreads have risen, albeit to a lesser 
extent than in Europe. The negative effects of the deterioration in the financial condition on firms’ 
investments and household consumption are not expected to be offset by the positive effects of the 
fiscal stimulus proposed for 2012 by President Obama. The difficulties in getting agreement on the 
expansionary measures introduced by the American Jobs Act in September are likely to reduce 
considerably the impact of the bill. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the proposed 
measures would increase spending by $50 billion in the fiscal year 2012, and cut tax revenues by $213 
billion. Based on a simulation using NiGEM, the package is expected to raise growth by 0.3 percentage 
points in 2012 and 0.2% in 2013.  
4.3 United Kingdom  
UK economic growth in the first three quarters of 2011 has been weak. The volatility of quarterly 
growth rates is due to a series of ‘special factors’2.. The average rate of quarterly growth in 2011 was just 
0.3%. NIESR’s monthly estimate of GDP suggests the UK economy expanded by just 0.1% in the final 
quarter of 2011, with the production sector a noticeable drag on the economy (declining by 1.3% in the 
fourth quarter of 2011). Overall, GDP growth has decelerated from 2.1% per annum in 2010 to 1% in 
2011. The UK economy is currently 3.6% below its pre-recession peak.  
                                                     
2 These factors include the rebound in the first quarter of the year from a contraction due to exceptionally adverse weather in the final quarter of 
2010. The second quarter of the year was affected by the additional holidays associated with the Royal Wedding, the effect of payments of 
Olympic tickets and the effect on supply chains from the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. 
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The latest data suggest the economy is further away from rebalancing than previously estimated. The 
estimate for the current account deficit has been revised from 2.5% of GDP in 2010 to 3.3% of GDP. 
While the latest vintage of data now show deterioration in the UK’s balance of payments in 2011: the 
current account deficit has widened from 2% of GDP in the first and second quarters to 4% of GDP in 
the third quarter of that year. The widening current account deficit is due to adverse movements in all 
three components: trade, income and transfer balances. But predominately due to the surplus on the 
income account shrinking from 1.3% of GDP in the second quarter of 2011 to 0.1% in the third quarter 
of this. The Office for National Statistics suggests this is due to lower profits of UK banks and the 
foreign subsidiaries of UK non-financial corporations and an increase in the profits of foreign owned 
banks operating in the UK. Movements in income credits and debits are volatile and we do expect the 
surplus on the income account to widen over the short to medium term. We expect the deficit on the 
current account to narrow over the next couple of years. The deficit on the trade account is forecast to 
narrow, but this is due more to a weak domestic economy and the consequent muted demand for 
imports than to robust export growth. Net trade is expected to provide a positive contribution to GDP 
growth. We expect the domestic economy to be a drag on economic growth next year. A recession in 
the first half of the year is followed by a return to more robust growth at the end of 2012. Overall the 
UK economy is expected to expand by 0.2% per annum in 2012, accelerating to 2.3% in 2013. 
Unemployment has begun to rise again in the UK. The ILO unemployment rate has increased from 
7.7% at the start of 2011 to 8.3% in the third quarter of this year. We expect the hoarding of labour to 
persist in 2012. Employment is expected to fall next year, but the continued hoarding of labour is 
forecast to minimise the magnitude of this fall. Given the forecast expansion in the labour force we 
expect the rate of unemployment to increase throughout 2012 rising to towards 9% before falling back 
gradually over the course of 2013 and subsequent years. There is particular concern around the 
increase in youth unemployment and the government has recently announced measures designed to 
combat this phenomenon3. The ‘Youth Contract’ will provide measures including support for extra 
jobsearch activity, wage subsidies for employers, and a new programme to support disadvantaged 16-
17 year olds into education and training. 
Given the poor outlook for the UK economy and the insistence of the UK government on persisting 
with the planned magnitude of fiscal consolidation in the short-term, it is unsurprising that financial 
markets currently expect the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to increase Bank Rate in December 
2013, at the earliest. In addition the MPC of the Bank of England has restarted quantitative easing, 
almost exclusively government bonds. An additional £75 billion of assets will be added to the Bank’s 
balance sheet by February 2012. If our current point forecast materialises as the outturn then recent 
                                                     
3 The number of 16-24 year olds defined as unemployed increased to 1.03 million the three months to October 2011; an increase of 5.6% from 
the three months to July 2011. 
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speeches by MPC members make it clear that quantitative easing would be extended even further (see, 
for example, Weale, 2011). 
The rate of CPI inflation has been persistently above the MPC’s target of 2% per annum in 2011. Much 
of this can be explained by temporary factors: the increase in the standard rate of VAT at the start of the 
year, the effect the sharp increases in commodity prices as well as the continued feed through of robust 
import prices into consumer prices. These factors will stop contributing to the upward momentum of 
prices and we expect the rate of inflation to drop below 2% per annum in the second half of 2012. In the 
absence of any further positive shocks to the price level we expect to see the large amount of spare 
capacity (around 4% on our current estimates) bear down on consumer price inflation.  
The UK government’s self-imposed Fiscal Mandate has a primary target of balancing the cyclically-
adjusted public sector current budget, on a fiscal year basis, at a five year horizon (currently 2016-17). 
They have tasked the newly created Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) with evaluating whether 
there is a greater than evens chance of this outcome. In their latest forecast, published at the end of 
November 2011, the OBR suggested that there was a greater than evens chance of this outcome, but this 
positive evaluation occurred only after the government announced additional spending cuts equivalent 
to 1.5% of GDP over the period 2015-16 to 2016-17. On the basis of the Maastricht criteria we expect the 
deficit on the government’s financial balance to shrink from 10.2% of GDP in 2010 to 7.4% in 2013.   
4.4 Central and Eastern Europe 
Compared to 2010, in 2011 the macroeconomic situation in the majority of Central and Eastern 
European EU member states outside the euro area has improved. The strongest upturn was registered 
in the Baltic states, where GDP growth rates were above 5% on the back of a robust recovery of 
consumer and investment demand. Domestic demand also fuelled economic growth in Bulgaria and 
Romania, though at comparably low rates (2-3%). The main driver of the region remained Poland, 
where GDP growth accelerated slightly to 4.2%, thereby keeping up with its high pace in 2010. While 
consumer demand was fairly strong and investment gained momentum, the main reason for the solid 
performance of the Polish economy was the improvement in the foreign trade balance following a 
weakening of the zloty in the second half of the year. The Czech Republic registered a slight slowdown 
in growth (to below 2%) due to shrinking consumer demand, in spite of strong net exports, which were 
offsetting a part of this disadvantageous trend. The Hungarian economy was pushed into serious 
turmoil due to internal policy debates and attempts to limit central bank independence. This led to 
reduced international support (by the IMF), a loss of foreign investors’ trust and mounting costs of 
public debt servicing. As a consequence, Hungary registered the lowest growth among CEE countries 
(slightly above 1%) in 2011, with vanishing domestic demand and fragile prospects for the coming 
years. 
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The outlook for Eastern Europe is overshadowed by uncertainties resulting from the sovereign debt 
crisis in the euro area. We expect a deterioration in the access to capital and a worsening in consumer 
confidence. In addition, several countries (Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Cyprus in 2012 and 
the Czech Republic in 2013) face deadlines for fiscal corrections under the excessive deficit procedure, 
which will require some tough fiscal adjustments, and will further weaken domestic demand. Poor 
prospects for growth in the EU as a whole will hamper exports from Eastern Europe. This is only partly 
compensated by weaker imports, resulting from slowing domestic demand and – in countries with 
flexible exchange rates – rather weak currencies. As a result, we expect deterioration in GDP dynamics 
in all analysed countries for 2012, with stable growth only in Bulgaria. In 2013, growth is likely to 
accelerate again, driven by a gradual recovery in the euro area and an improvement in general 
economic sentiment. A notable exception is Poland, where we expect a slight slowdown in 2013 
compared to 2012, due to further weakening of investment demand and de-stocking.  
5 CENTRAL FORECAST FOR THE EURO AREA 
After growth in GDP of 0.8% in the first quarter of 2011, GDP growth in the euro area declined to 0.2% 
in the second and third quarter. The weaker growth mainly reflected stagnant domestic demand, while 
export growth continued to hold up also in the third quarter (+1.5%). All sectors of production were 
affected by the weakening in activity since the beginning of the year. Growth in manufacturing stalled 
in the 3rd quarter, while construction contracted for two quarters in a row. The cyclical position 
continues to be very diverse across the euro area countries. In the third quarter, euro area GDP was 
1.4% above its level in 2010 Q3. The major contributor to the third quarter growth was the 2.6% growth 
in Germany, while in the same period GDP in Greece, Portugal, Slovenia and Cyprus declined further 
with an increase of less than 1% in Italy and Spain. 
With the re-emergence of the public debt crisis in late August, the euro area became the major source of 
risk to the continuation of the world economic recovery. The renewed concerns about the stability of 
public finances have driven up government bond yields in highly indebted euro area member states. 
This gives rise to a risk of a vicious circle operating between banks’ balance sheets and public finances: 
the higher yields both hamper the ability of highly indebted countries to refinance the debt and 
seriously damage banks’ balance sheets. This has accelerated the flight from bonds of those countries 
and has driven up yields even further. As a result, bond yields temporarily increased to close to or even 
above 7% for Italy and Spain, while they declined for Germany. In the beginning of this year, some 
auctions even resulted in negative yields on short-term German bonds.  
With some delay, on 27 October and on 9 December the European Council agreed to a fiscal compact 
and stronger policy coordination and governance in order to increase the credibility of budgetary 
policies by enhancing the commitment to keep structural deficits close to zero. This is to be achieved by 
the so-called debt break, i.e. (possibly constitutional) national laws to limit structural fiscal deficits to 
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0.5% of GDP. The plans have yet to pass national parliaments. New governments in Italy and Spain are 
about to implement consolidation measures of a substantial magnitude. Further measures include the 
faster implementation of the ESM and higher capital requirements for banks.  
Still, despite some improvement on bond markets, confidence remains very fragile in early 2012 and 
money markets are almost frozen. The Euribor/OIS-spread, a measure of banks’ reluctance to lend to 
one another, rose in December to its highest level in 2½ years. The latest ECB bank lending survey from 
October showed a significant tightening of credit standards due to deteriorating access to market 
financing – in terms of both money markets and debt securities issuance – and partly due to a worse 
economic outlook. Part of the reason for this tightening might be the rise in capital requirements. 
Recent EBA regulations require banks to raise their core capital (tier 1) ratio to 9% by mid-2012, which 
implies a capital shortfall of about €115 billion. A number of banks appear to have difficulties with 
finding appropriate sources of capital.  
In response to this situation, the ECB has continued its expansionary policy stance. Since July, the main 
refinancing rate was lowered by 50 basis points to 1%. The ECB has also revived its programs to buy 
government bonds on a moderate scale and has taken decisive action to boost liquidity: in mid-
December euro area banks hastened to take up the offer of 3-year loans at an interest rate of 1%. They 
borrowed an amount of €490 billion. Furthermore, to counter the outflow of foreign funds, the ECB has 
announced the extension of US-liquidity providing measures from its mutual swap lines with the 
Federal Reserve. 
Clearly, the success of these policies and possible future measures aimed at resolving the debt crisis 
will be crucial for the evolution of the euro area economy in forthcoming years.  
In the Central Forecast it is assumed that a credible plan is implemented to restore confidence in the 
debt of euro area governments in the first half of 2012, though there is no clear evidence that the 
programmes put forward so far are succeeding in achieving this goal. Therefore, the central forecast 
that is presented below is based on the assumption that policy makers continue to ‘muddle through’ 
the crisis and that this will be sufficient to see confidence returning in the second half of the year.  
Country-specific risk premia are assumed to remain high to mid-2012. We assume policy is adapted 
gradually over this period to ensure that there is not a complete collapse of the euro, and over time, 
markets begin to accept that authorities will continue to adjust policy as necessary, allowing risk 
premia to recede from the middle of the year and throughout 2013. 
In addition to the high risk premia on government debt in a number of euro area economies, there are 
two other key assumptions underlying our central forecast: the significant pro-cyclical tightening of 
fiscal policy across Europe and the sharp tightening of bank lending conditions, which is partly 
attributable to the recapitalisation requirements imposed by the European Banking Authority 
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consequent on the latest round of stress tests. Both of these assumptions are discussed in greater depth 
in separate sections of this report. 
The technical assumptions underlying the central projections are as follows. Fiscal programmes as 
detailed in table 3.1 of this report have been implemented using the NiGEM model. For the euro area as 
a whole, these measures amount to 1.5% and 1% of GDP in 2012 and 2013, respectively. We impose 
high borrowing constraints on both firms and households for the first half of 2012. This is implemented 
through a rise in bank lending rates of 2.4 percentage points for the first two quarters of the year, 
compounded by a rise in the sensitivity of household spending to current income. Government bond 
spreads over Germany are assumed to remain at current levels to June 2012, and then narrow by 10% 
per quarter thereafter. 
Overall, following an increase of 1.7% in 2011, we expect euro area real GDP to stagnate in 2012 and to 
rise by 1.4% in 2013. In 2012, domestic demand will be depressed by fiscal consolidation and somewhat 
tighter credit standards. For the euro area as a whole, the fiscal deficit is forecast to decline to 3.1% in 
2013 from 4.2% in 2011 and 3.3% in 2012. All components of domestic demand are expected to contract 
in 2012. Private consumption is expected to decline by 0.3% in 2012, as fiscal consolidation reduces real 
disposable household income by the same amount. Capital formation will be restrained by weak 
demand and tighter credit conditions. The decline in domestic demand is, however, offset by a positive 
contribution from net exports. With the impulse from fiscal consolidation dying out and bank lending 
conditions loosening, the economy should reach a turning point in mid-2012 and moderate growth 
should resume. 
In December 2011, euro area HICP inflation stood at 3.0%. Core inflation (excluding energy and 
unprocessed food) amounted to 2.0%. In spite of various tax increases, the rate of inflation is forecast to 
decline to 1.8% in 2012 and 1.4% in 2013. In coming months the effects of the sharp increase in oil prices 
in late 2010 and early 2011 will vanish. This should reduce the rate of inflation close to 2.0%. Looking 
further ahead, weak demand is likely to dampen inflationary pressure over the entire forecast horizon. 
Labour markets are expected to hold up well given the weak growth prospects. The unemployment 
rate would increase slightly from 10.1% in 2011 to 10.5% in 2012 and decline to 10.2% in 2013. 
A distinct feature of the current recovery is that there are pronounced differences in the momentum of 
growth across countries. These differences are expected to persist over the forecast horizon and thereby 
contribute to some narrowing in current account imbalances and competitiveness differentials. Among 
the large euro area economies, growth in 2012 is expected to be negative in France, Italy and Spain as 
the fiscal tightening and the fragile condition of the banking sector weigh heavily on these countries. 
On the other hand, GDP in Germany is expected to increase by 0.5%. Similarly, in 2013 inflation is 
forecast to reach 2.1% in Germany, while remaining at 1.1% in France and Italy.  
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Table 2: Euro Area Forecast Details 
 Annual percentage change 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Consumption 1.7 0.3 -1.1 0.9 0.3 -0.3 1.1 
Private investment 5.0 -1.5 -13.9 -0.6 2.8 -2.5 4.5 
Government expenditure 2.2 2.1 2.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.5 
Stockbuilding 0.3 -0.1 -0.8 0.6 0.2 -0.2 0.1 
Total domestic demand 2.7 0.3 -3.5 1.0 0.8 -0.9 1.7 
Export volumes 6.7 0.8 -12.8 10.9 6.5 2.6 5.9 
Import volumes 6.2 0.7 -11.6 9.1 4.6 0.9 7.1 
GDP growth 3.0 0.3 -4.2 1.8 1.7 0.0 1.4 
Average earnings 2.1 2.9 2.1 0.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.6 1.8 1.4 
Private consumption deflator 2.2 2.7 -0.4 1.7 2.4 1.9 1.4 
Real personal disposable income 1.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 -0.8 -0.3 0.7 
Standardised unemployment rate, 
% 
7.6 7.7 9.6 10.1 10.1 10.5 10.2 
Govt. balance as % of GDP -0.7 -2.0 -6.3 -6.0 -4.2 -3.3 -3.1 
Govt. debt as % of GDP 66.2 69.9 79.3 85.1 87.9 89.6 89.5 
Current account balance as % of 
GDP 
0.1 -1.6 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 2.0 1.3 
 
5.1 Germany  
The strong recovery of the German economy has continued in 2011, although the economic expansion 
lost momentum during the course of the year. In the second quarter of 2011, output exceeded the pre-
Great Recession levels. After a relatively weak expansion in the second quarter, in the third quarter, 
GDP growth accelerated again to 0.5%. There was a particularly strong expansion in domestic demand. 
Private consumption recovered after the decline in the second quarter. Investment in machinery and 
equipment continued to increase, although not as strongly as during 2010. Exports and imports 
expanded at almost the same pace resulting in a slightly positive contribution to GDP growth from 
foreign trade.  
Towards the end of the year, however, the recovery has clearly faltered. Indicators suggest that GDP 
has contracted in the fourth quarter, mainly due to weak exports. In addition, the deterioration in the 
external environment and the strong increase in the financial stress indicator calculated by the Kiel 
Institute (see Box below) provide evidence of a weak investment climate. 
The recent stabilization of the sentiment indicators suggests, however, that production will not 
plummet as in late 2008. Based on the assumption that the sovereign debt crisis will not worsen, we 
expect that growth in investment will resume in the course of 2012, and private consumption will 
stabilize domestic demand through the year. Exports to Western Europe will suffer but exports to the 
rest of the world are expected to continue rising. Due to the resilient domestic demand, net exports are 
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likely to dampen the expansion of real GDP. All in all, we expect GDP to rise by 0.5%. The labour 
market will be affected only modestly and the unemployment rate (ILO definition) will decrease 
somewhat further from 5.9% in 2011 (and 7.1% in 2010). The inflation rate will decline to 1.8%. 
In 2013 the German economy will gain renewed momentum, although the high growth rates of 2010 
and 2011 will not be repeated. Capacity utilization is estimated to be above its normal level already so 
that the endogenous factors will start to weaken the upswing and, in particular, higher wage growth 
will start to bite into employment growth. With an increase in hourly wages of almost 3% in 2011 and 
2012 and increases in unit labor costs of 2.2% and 1.5% in 2011 and 2012, respectively (compared to -
1.5% and 0.9% in 2010 and 2011, respectively), the overall price competitiveness, which is also aided by 
a weaker dollar, will remain largely unchanged over the forecast horizon, but will start diminishing 
vis-à-vis the rest of the euro area. 
All in all, GDP will increase by 2%. Domestic demand will again be the main driver of expansion, while 
net exports to the rest of the euro area will continue to shrink. Overall, due to reacceleration in exports 
to the euro area, the effect of foreign trade to growth should be neutral. Unemployment will continue 
to decline, and inflation will accelerate slightly to 2.0%. 
The slowdown will affect public finances only modestly since domestic demand is likely to remain 
intact and the labour market situation is not deteriorating. The public deficit will stay constant at 
approximately 1.1% of GDP in 2012 and 2013. The government has introduced a large number of 
measures that are designed to raise revenue and reduce expenditure in 2012. They are, however, 
generally small in size and will produce a combined fiscal impulse of -0.5% of GDP, which is modest in 
comparison to most other European countries. This policy will prevent a slight increase in the deficit 
that would have occurred otherwise. In 2013 the fiscal impulse will be almost zero. There will be a 
slight decline in gross debt relative to GDP from the estimated 80% level in 2012, and a more significant 
decline to approximately 78% in 2013. 
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Box: Financial Market Stress Index for the Euro Area and Germany 
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 has strongly increased the attention to monitoring financial market 
variables by economic research institutions all over the world. International institutions such as the 
IMF and the OECD, central banks, such as the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and 
private banks such as Citigroup and Deutsche Bank, have developed financial stress indices in order to 
produce early warning indicators of problems in financial markets. In general, an increase in these 
indicators points to a significant increase in the risk perception of market participants. A variety of 
economic studies have shown that stress in financial markets may lead to economic contractions and 
may even trigger severe recessions (Bloom 2009 and IMF 2011).  
The movement of single financial indicators, such as increasing stock market volatility or surging 
interest spreads, are related but not identical to an exacerbation in financial conditions. On the one 
hand, stock market volatility could be low simply due to low transaction volumes and low trading 
frequency; on the other hand, stock market volatility may be high simply due to new information in the 
market, such that trade volumes surge without having a direct negative impact on financial conditions 
(Blix-Grimaldi 2010). A financial stress indicator should, therefore, consist of several financial market 
variables that reflect the state of the financial system and indicate a regime of financial stress when the 
indicator significantly increases.  
The indicators for financial stress presented here are calculated for the euro area and for Germany, 
respectively, and have been introduced by van Roye (2011). The indicators exploit the information from 
different financial variables and transform it into one single measure by applying an approximate 
dynamic factor model as employed by Brave and Butters (2011) for the United States. The indicator is 
constructed using 22 financial variables that are divided into 3 subcategories. The first group consists of 
financial variables from the banking sector. The second group includes financial variables from the 
securities and stock market. The third group captures real exchange rate volatility. In general, high 
volatilities and high yield spreads have a positive contribution to the indicator, i.e. increasing 
volatilities and rising yield spreads lead to an increase of financial stress.  
Increases in the indicators have significant negative effects on economic activity both for Germany and 
the euro area. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the financial stress indicator leads to a 
decrease in GDP growth on an annualized basis of about 0.5 percentage points. The dampening effect 
on GDP growth is quite persistent. The decline reaches its trough after 4 quarters and growth slowly 
converges back to the initial rate. 
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5.2 France  
The French recovery came to a halt in the second quarter of 2011, with a slight decline in GDP of 0.1% 
in that quarter, and an increase by a mere 0.3% in the third quarter, according to the second release of 
national accounts (revised downwards from 0.4%, following the incorporation of the latest industrial 
production data). In the second quarter of 2011 both households’ consumption and private investment 
growth began to decelerate, while government spending growth was almost flat. External trade 
provided an almost neutral contribution to growth on average in the first three quarters of 2011. Hence, 
in the third quarter of 2011 French GDP was still 0.5% below its 2008Q1 level. Although in the 2008 
crisis, GDP decreased less rapidly in France than in Germany, the recovery has also been less rapid. 
Industrial production declined by 1.0% in the last three months to November as compared to the 
previous three months, and was still 10% below its early 2008 level. The French economy has come to a 
standstill, and latest business and consumer survey results suggest that GDP decreased in the last 
quarter of 2011. According to both OFCE’s quarterly GDP indicator and INSEE’s forecasts released in 
December, French GDP fell by around 0.2% in the last quarter of the year.  
Annual HICP inflation rose by 2.7% in December 2011, as compared to 1.8% a year earlier, reflecting 
upward pressures mainly from energy and food prices. Although the underlying inflation rate also 
increased over recent months, it remains moderate at 1.7% on a y-o-y basis. If energy prices stabilise as 
we expect, and in the absence of wage pressures, consumer price inflation will recede over the forecast 
horizon. The French economy is clearly operating below its optimum capacity, with the unemployment 
rate standing at 9.8% in November 2011 according to EUROSTAT ILO figures.  
In the initial phase of the recovery, French output benefited from a fiscal package, but in 2010 the fiscal 
stance became contractionary, and was tightened further in 2011. According to our estimates, the 
negative fiscal impulse amounted to 1.4% of GDP in 2011, of which 1.1% was tax based and 0.3% was 
spending based. General government borrowing will probably come close to 5.8% of GDP in 2011, after 
7.1% in 2010. The French government has announced it will bring the deficit down to 4.5% of GDP in 
2012 and 3% in 2013, and has stated that it will remain committed to this target even if GDP growth 
turns out to be lower than expected in the budget forecast (1% in 2012). Under current budget plans, 
the fiscal stance is strongly negative over the forecast horizon: fiscal tightening will amount to 1.7% of 
GDP per annum in 2012 and 2013, of which 1.1% of GDP is tax based in 2012 and 0.6% spending based, 
while it would be equally split between taxes and spending in 2013.  
In our central scenario, French GDP will decline by 0.3% in 2012, however,. there is a risk that the 
government would increase fiscal tightening further, in order to meet its deficit target, if GDP declines 
in 2012 as in our forecast. This could initiate a vicious circle of adding fiscal consolidation in the short-
run in order to meet targets for deficits-to-GDP ratios, thereby depressing domestic demand further at 
a time when fiscal policy is tightened almost everywhere else in the EU, with the major exception of 
Germany. The main downward risk for the French economy in the short run is the simultaneous 
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implementation of fiscal austerity plans in major EU economic partners. With French export markets 
being mostly in the EU, there is hardly any chance that stronger external demand could offset the 
negative impact of domestic fiscal consolidation in the short run.  
However, our central scenario assumes that the tensions related to the sovereign debt crisis will recede 
over 2012. This would allow for better growth prospects in 2013, with French GDP growing by 1.7%, 
which is below the growth in Germany (2%) but well above that in Italy (-0.1%). This would leave the 
unemployment rate close to 10%.  
5.3 Italy  
Following a slow recovery, the economic picture worsened during the third quarter, and Italy's GDP 
decreased by 0.2%. Growth was sustained by net exports (0.8 percentage point contribution to GDP 
growth), while both domestic demand and inventories contributed negatively (-0.4 percentage points 
and -0.5 percentage points, respectively). 
Inflation has increased after the summer: in October, the twelve-month producer price inflation was 
still at 4.7%, and in December consumer price inflation reached 3.4%. Prices have already incorporated 
the VAT increase enacted in September, and some measures on tariffs and taxes on fuel. Core inflation 
remained low. The latest business surveys and producer prices of manufactured goods indicate less 
pressure on input costs. 
The latest indicators confirmed that domestic demand is weak. It is depressed by the poor employment 
outlook and mounting uncertainty over the general economic situation. Exports are at risk in the 
context of a world demand that is losing momentum. 
The Italian outlook, however, depends primarily on the impact of the crisis on its sovereign debt. This 
situation remains unresolved. 
During the summer, in response to the strains in the financial markets, the Italian Government 
approved two austerity packages for the years 2011-2014. These fiscal packages were aimed at 
addressing the main problem of the Italian public finances - the need to reduce public debt, and at 
reassuring financial markets. Together, the two packages provide a reduction in the net borrowing that 
is officially estimated to be €2.8 billion in 2011 (0.2% of GDP), €28.3 billion in 2012 (1.7% of GDP), and 
€54.3 billion and €59.8 billion in 2013 and 2014, respectively (3.3% and 3.5% of GDP in 2013 and 2014, 
respectively).  
Despite the fact that the size of the correction was consistent with the level of the Italian structural 
deficit (which is around 3% of GDP, 1% of which is the cyclical component), and the aim of reducing 
the debt/GDP ratio, the rise in the spread on Italian sovereign bonds during the autumn signalled that 
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the financial markets consider the probability of a consistent improvement in the Italian public finances 
to be very low. 
There are two main reasons behind the Italian sovereign debt crisis and the rise in spreads, other than 
the uncertainty of governance that affects the EMU itself. On the one hand, the Italian political system 
lacks credibility, and this is judged to be unsuitable for the implementation of the package. On the 
other hand, there is a lack of reform aimed at tackling the main issues in the Italian economy, such as 
growth and competitiveness.  
In addition, austerity will depress growth and, in the context of global economic slowdown, this is 
likely to have a negative impact on the fiscal balance itself. The rise in interest rate spreads represents 
an additional risk for the fiscal consolidation by increasing interest expenditure and by creating a 
vicious circle where the pessimistic mood of the markets becomes self-fulfilling. 
With this background, the newly appointed Government with Mario Monti as Prime Minister has to 
reverse this negative trend in order to reassure the financial markets, not only with the additional fiscal 
correction, but also with the implementation of credible structural reforms aimed at enhancing growth. 
The new Ministers were appointed on November 19th and they prepared a fiscal plan, which was 
approved by the Parliament on November 22nd. 
Considering the three plans together, they provide a reduction in the net borrowing that is officially 
estimated to be €48.4 billion in 2012 (3% of GDP), €75.6 billion in 2013 and €81.2 billion in 2014 (4.6% 
and 4.8% of GDP in 2013 and 2014, respectively). 
More than 60% of the adjustment, or €51 billion in 2014, will come from increases in revenues, while 
spending cuts are estimated at €30billion. 
The largest effect of the measures, estimated at around €36 billion in 2012 and €60 billion in 2014 (75% 
of the total adjustment), will be felt by the household sector. Of this, €12 billion in 2012 and €21 billion 
in 2014 are expected to come from measures that will reduce households’ disposable income: fiscal and 
welfare cuts, tax on income from financial assets, solidarity contributions on high incomes and on high 
pensions, savings on public employment, and significant measures in the pension system. In addition, 
other measures, estimated at around 22% of the total adjustment, will impact households’ purchasing 
power: the increase in stamp duty on securities accounts, the introduction of a municipal real estate 
levy based on the value of properties and local services, excise taxes on fuel, tax surcharges on luxury 
items and a tax on the so-called ‘tax shielded’ assets. Finally, purchasing power will be negatively 
affected by the increase in the VAT rate from 20% to 21%, which is expected to increase inflation by 
approximately 0.5 percentage points in 2012. Another increase (from 21% to 23% and from 10% to 11%) 
can be implemented in September 2012 (and will be followed by a further increase in the rates of half a 
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percentage point in 2014) if the government does not manage to implement the law on tax and welfare 
reform (which would produce €13.1 billion of additional revenue in 2013 and €16.4 billion in 2014). 
Only a small part of the adjustment will affect firms directly: corporate income measures (surtax on 
energy sector, increase in the rate of IRAP, the regional tax on productive activities, applying to bank 
and insurance companies and others) account for € 8 billion. In fact, there are measures aimed at 
enhancing growth focused mainly on firms, the most important of which are the introduction of a tax 
benefit for recapitalisations, the reduction of the tax wedge on labour, which is operating through tax 
deduction from IRAP, especially in the case of employment of women and young workers, and the re-
funding of the guarantee fund for SMEs. 
Spending cuts in direct public consumption and investment amount to around €18 billion. A large part 
of the spending cuts will be achieved through cuts in local government expenditure, €9.2 billion, and 
savings on the healthcare system, €5 billion.  
According to our estimates, the overall impact of the package on economic activity (assuming almost 
complete ex-ante effectiveness of the measures) is about 2.2% of GDP in the period 2012-2014 (with 
respect to a baseline scenario without fiscal adjustment) of which 1.3% is in 2012, 0.7% is in 2013 and 
0.2% is in 2014.  
In our estimates more than 40% of the negative effect on GDP comes from the impact on private 
consumption, mainly through measures that affect households’ disposable income directly. Moreover, 
real disposable income will be negatively affected by the increase in VAT. Expenditure reductions 
explain one third of the negative effect on GDP. 
Despite the less favourable GDP growth, we expect that a “close to balance” position could be achieved 
in 2013. 
The debt crisis is having negative effects on the Italian economy not only through the necessity for 
restrictive fiscal policy, but also through other channels. First of all, households are experiencing 
financial wealth losses through both the depreciation of Italian sovereign bonds and the reduction in 
value on stock exchanges. Higher interest rates also affect the cost of mortgages for households. The 
cost of borrowing is also affecting firms, and the risk of a new credit crunch is now very high. Given 
the weak economic outlook and the difficulties of more indebted firms, the latest financial crisis may 
have a further negative impact on growth. 
All in all, without any counter-action, a new recession during the winter is expected, and all the 
components of GDP are forecast to decline during the next two quarters. 
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6 DOWNSIDE SCENARIO 
The central scenario, shown above, assumed that the funding problems of Italy and Spain are gradually 
overcome in the early months of 2012. By contrast, in this downside scenario, the economic crisis is 
assumed to deepen, with a consequential impact on risk premia and on the banking system persisting 
through to the end of this year. The result of these assumptions would be that the euro area would 
continue to limp from crisis to crisis over the course of the year with, for example, the funding needs of 
Spain and Italy being met on a “just in time” basis. Related to this uncertainty about sovereign debt, the 
pressures on the EU banking system would remain acute: this scenario assumes a return to the banking 
crisis conditions that persisted in Europe in 2008-2009.  
We implement these assumptions by raising the risk premium on borrowing by 5 percentage points in 
the first quarter of 2012, to reach the peak that they attained in 2009. Risk premia are assumed to 
remain at this level until the end of 2012, and recede gradually over 2013. The Government risk 
premium in Italy and Spain is assumed to rise by a further 275 basis points in 2012 compared to the 
base, and recede gradually in 2013. Elsewhere in the euro area, bond spreads are assumed to remain at 
current levels until the end of 2012, whereas they begin to decline in the second half of 2012 in our 
central forecast scenario. We also assume greater liquidity constraints for consumers than in our central 
forecast scenario, although the impact of these constraints on consumer spending would, to some 
extent, be offset by weaker inflation. 
The impact of these very adverse conditions would be to move the euro area into recession in 2012 with 
a fall in GDP of just over 2%, and there would be a further fall in GDP in 2013 of 1.1% (Figure 6). 
Compared to the central forecast the growth rate of GDP in 2012 and 2013 would be reduced by 
between 2 and 2.5 percentage points each year with a cumulative reduction in the level of GDP over the 
two years relative to the central forecast of almost 5%. While in this “downside” scenario the volume of 
consumption would fall in both 2012 and 2013 (and fall relative to the central forecast) as shown in 
Figure 7, the impact would be much greater on investment (Figure 8), reflecting the very adverse 
pressures on the cost of capital and the greatly heightened uncertainty. 
The impact of such a negative outcome would be to raise the unemployment rate in the euro area and it 
would have serious negative consequences for the euro area government balance. In spite of the 
contractionary stance of fiscal policy across the euro area, the government balance as a percentage of 
GDP would increase from a deficit of 4.2% in 2011 to 5.4% in 2013. By contrast, the central forecast 
envisages a government deficit in the euro area in 2013 of 3.1% of GDP. We have not made any 
adjustment to fiscal policy in this scenario, although under the new fiscal compact additional fiscal 
tightening measures may be required as deficits widen. This would exacerbate the projected declines in 
GDP. 
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Figure 6: GDP Growth in the Euro Area 
 
 
Figure 7: Consumer Spending Growth in the Euro Area 
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Figure 8: Investment Growth in the Euro Area 
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Under this scenario, the risk premia on government debt drops back to ‘normal’ levels in the first 
quarter of 2012 in most euro area economies. We allow a high premium to remain in those countries 
operating under bail-out programmes, although yields begin to recede in these countries as well from 
early 2012. While some tightening of bank lending conditions is inevitable in the first half of 2012 given 
the requirements to raise capital ratios by June 2012, we assume only the minimum tightening is 
required, with no spillovers to uncertainty in the banking system as a whole. This is implemented 
through a 0.8 percentage point rise in bank lending rates for the first two quarters of 2012, compared to 
the 2.4 percentage point rise in the central forecast scenario. We ease liquidity constraints on 
consumers, allowing a greater degree of consumption smoothing through borrowing than in the central 
forecast scenario. 
In the upside scenario, GDP is forecast to grow by 0.8% in 2012, compared with zero growth in the 
central forecast as shown in Figure 6 above. In 2013, GDP growth is forecast to accelerate to 1.8%, 
which is half a percentage point higher than in the median forecast. 
The upside scenario does not promise strong growth for the euro area; rather it would mark the 
beginning of normalisation for the euro area economies. Even in this scenario, in Spain the ratio of debt 
to GDP, though on a relatively comfortable level, only stabilises at around 75% of GDP in 2012-13, and 
the government budget balance is expected to be -5.2% and -3.8% of GDP in 2012 and 2013, respectively 
(Figure 9). In Italy, which is central for further development of the debt crisis, the high debt-to-GDP 
ratio would start declining rather strongly from a level of 125% as the general turnaround would be 
supported by recently introduced domestic austerity measures. The Italian government budget balance 
would be -1% of GDP in 2012, and would become marginally positive in 2013 under our upside 
scenario, as shown in figure 10 below. 
The upside scenario is regarded as less probable than the downside scenario, which reflects the series 
of unsuccessful attempts in the past to resolve the crisis. The differences in the three scenarios arise 
primarily from differences with respect to policy measures assumed to be implemented and differences 
in the assumed success of those policies in convincing financial markets. 
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Figure 9: Government Budget Balance (% GDP) in Spain 
 
 
Figure 10: Government Budget Balance (% GDP) in Italy 
 
-7.9 
-10.1 
-6.0 -5.7 
-5.2 
-3.8 
-12 
-10 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2012 2013 
P
er
 c
en
t 
Downside scenario Central forecast Upside scenario 
-3.1 
-4.7 
-1.7 
-1.2 -1.0 
0.8 
-5 
-4 
-3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
2012 2013 
P
er
 c
en
t 
Downside scenario Central forecast Upside scenario 
Economic Assessment of the Euro Area 
   
Euroframe Network: Winter 2011/12 Report 32 
8 IMPACT OF FISCAL POLICY TIGHTENING IN THE EURO AREA IN 
2011 - 2013 
8.1 Methodology 
It is not straightforward to measure the stance of fiscal policy because the change in government 
borrowing in any year is a function of both changes in the underlying economy and discretionary 
changes in policy.  
When cyclical factors (or structural changes) result in substantial deviations of the growth rate in an 
economy from the rate of growth in potential output this can have a substantial impact on the fiscal 
balance. This was particularly acute in the case of the collapse in economic activity in the euro area in 
2009. In many cases, such as Ireland, the deterioration in the fiscal position as a result of the collapse in 
output was worse than might have been expected based on previous research (e.g. Van den Noord, 
2000).  
Even measuring discretionary fiscal action is not a straightforward process as it is very often rather 
different from the fiscal measures announced in a budget. For example, in the case of excise taxes, an 
increase in the rate of excise duty is considered a discretionary budgetary measure by governments in 
many countries whereas it might be more sensible to assume that excise tax rates are indexed to the 
rate of inflation and that deviations from this indexed rate are considered as discretionary. 
In the light of these difficulties there are a number of different approaches to measuring the fiscal 
stance. However, here we adopt the simple expedient of measuring the impact of the fiscal measures 
announced by individual governments set out in Table 3.1 below. 
The possible limitations of this approach can be gauged by comparing the announced fiscal action with 
that measured using an alternative approach by OFCE based on data in the autumn 2011 OECD 
Economic Outlook using trend GDP (Table 3.2). This comparison would suggest that the actual impact 
of fiscal policy on economic growth could be greater than that implied by the policy changes shown in 
Table 3.1 and this must be taken into account in considering the measured impact of this discretionary 
fiscal policy on economic growth in the euro area in 2011-13. 
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Table 3.1: Ex-ante Net Fiscal impulses 2011-2013 as announced by governments 
 
2011 2012 2013 
Fiscal 
impulse 
(% of 
2011  
GDP) 
of 
which 
tax 
based 
of 
which 
spendin
g based 
Fiscal 
impulse 
(% of 
2011  
GDP) 
of 
which 
tax 
based 
of 
which 
spendin
g based 
Fiscal 
impulse 
(% of 
2011  
GDP) 
of 
which 
tax 
based 
of 
which 
spendin
g based 
Austria -0.9 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 
Belgium -0.7 0 -0.7 -1.2 -0.5 -0.7 -1.3 -0.4 -0.9 
Finland -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 
France -1.4 -1.1 -0.3 -1.7 -1.1 -0.6 -1.7 -0.8 -0.8 
Germany -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 
Greece -2.7 -1.2 -1.5 -5.1 -3.5 -1.6 -2.0 -0.9 -1.1 
Ireland -3.4 -0.9 -2.5 -2.4 -1.0 -1.4 -2.1 -0.7 -1.4 
Italy -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 -3.0 -2.4 -0.6 -1.5 -0.6 -0.9 
Netherlands -0.8 -.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.45 -0.15 
Portugal -5.9 -2.7 -3.2 -2.1 0 -2.1 -1.9 -0.5 -1.4 
Spain -2.5 -0.5 -2.0 -2.1 -0.4 -1.7 -1.4 -0.3 -1.1 
UK -2.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.8 -0.2 -1.6 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 
Note: Here we define the fiscal impulse as the ex-ante expected change in revenue/spending as a % of 2011 GDP as a result of 
announced policy changes. The impact on GDP will depend on the fiscal multipliers in each country, and cannot be read 
directly from this table. The ex-post impact on government balances will depend on the response of GDP, and so also cannot 
be read directly from this table. 
Table 3.2:  Fiscal Impulses estimated using trend GDP growth 
 2011 2012 2013 Total 2011 -2013 Total 2011-2013 
from Table 3.1 Germany -1.0 -0.6 -0.7 -2.3 -0.8 
France -1.8 -2.3 -2.0 -6.1 -4.8 
Italy -1.6 -3.6 -2.9 -8.1 -5.0 
Spain -4.1 -3.0 -2.3 -9.4 -6.0 
Netherlands -1.4 -2.1 -1.0 -4.5 -2.0 
Belgium -0.8 -1.3 -1.4 -3.5 -3.2 
Austria -0.6 -1.2 -0.6 -2.4 -1.4 
Portugal -6.6 -4.5 -2.4 -13.5 -9.9 
Finland -1.0 -1.5 -0.9 -3.4 -1.0 
Ireland -1.5 -3.8 -3.0 -8.3 -7.9 
Greece -7.1 -5.1 -3.5 -15.7 -9.8 
UK -2.1 -1.8 -1.8 -5.7 -4.9 
Euro area -1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -5.8 -3.7 
Source: OFCE estimate using OECD Economic Outlook, November 2011 data. Estimates are calculated based on announced 
changes in cyclically adjusted balances, using pre-crisis trend GDP growth. 
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8.2 Discretionary Fiscal Action 
Subject to the limitations set out above, we use the NiGEM world model to provide a quantitative 
assessment of how the growth rate in 2012 and 2013 may be affected by the tightening of fiscal policy 
across the euro area. We use the “discretionary” measures as summarised in Table 3.1.  
We consider two alternative scenarios that incorporate different assumptions on the behaviour of 
financial markets. Because of the unusual situation in the euro area today this assessment of the impact 
of fiscal policy is not straightforward. Under normal circumstances a tightening in fiscal policy would 
be accompanied by a relaxation in monetary policy which would tend to offset the negative multiplier 
effects of the budgetary action. However, with interest rates already at exceptionally low levels, further 
tightening in fiscal action is unlikely to result in such an offsetting monetary policy reaction over the 
coming year. In both scenarios, policy interest rates of the ECB are held fixed until the end of 2013, and 
then respond to an interest rate rule, which is driven by deviations in inflation and nominal GDP from 
the baseline.  
In the first scenario, 10-year government bond yields are modelled as ‘rational’, in that the outturns are 
consistent with the expected path of short-term interest rates over a 10-year forward horizon, allowing 
for an exogenous risk premium. Fiscal tightening in 2011-2013 slows the euro area economy down, 
easing inflationary pressures, and policy interest rates would be expected to decline from 2014 when 
the feedback rule becomes endogenous. As a result, long-term interest rates decline immediately in the 
first scenario, softening the impact of the fiscal tightening to some degree. In the second scenario we 
treat long-term interest rates as adaptive, responding to current changes in policy rates, and so they 
remain fixed until the end of 2013.  
Exchange rate movements also differ between the two scenarios. In the first scenario we assume 
forward-looking financial markets, and exchange rates adjust to ensure that uncovered interest parity 
holds. In the second scenario exchange rates are held fixed to the baseline.  
In both scenarios we also raise the household savings rate by approximately 1 percentage point in the 
euro area, to capture a loss of consumer confidence and job security stemming from the fiscal 
tightening measures. 
8.3 The Macro-economic Impact of Fiscal Policy 
Countries having to implement very restrictive fiscal policies at a time of high government interest 
rates and financial instability will see, as a result, a large domestic output fall. Our central forecast 
presented in this report envisages a decline in GDP this year in France and Italy, and no growth in the 
euro area as a whole, which implies an area-wide recession in the first half of the year. Southern EU 
economies in particular would see a large output fall, followed by a recession and high unemployment. 
We expect the unemployment rate in the euro area as a whole to average 10.5% this year, and 
according to latest European Commission’s forecasts, the unemployment rate will reach 13.6% in 
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Portugal in 2012, 14.3% in Ireland, 18.4% in Greece, and 20.9% in Spain. In such circumstances, the 
government deficit targets will not be reached, which will call for additional restrictive measures, in 
accordance with the new ‘fiscal compact’ adopted by the EU Council on 9 December 2011. Such a 
policy would be unavoidable, according to the Commission, in order to reassure markets. But would a 
policy leading to a long depression period be reassuring?  
Figures 11 - 13 illustrate the estimated impact of the fiscal tightening programmes detailed in table 3.1 
above on key indicators in the euro area, according to the NiGEM simulations. We designate the first 
scenario described above as the “forward scenario” and the second scenario as the “backward 
scenario”. When we allow long-term interest rate and exchange rate adjustments to soften the impact 
on output (forward scenario), GDP growth in the euro area is estimated to be 0.6 - 0.8 percentage points 
weaker per annum in 2011-2013 as a result of the fiscal tightening measures introduced across Europe. 
Long-term interest rates decline by about 35 basis points as a result, while the exchange rate 
depreciates by 2.8%. If we believe that interest rates and exchange rates do not respond to the weaker 
economy (backward scenario), the impact on GDP growth is much stronger, reducing growth by 0.9-1.3 
percentage points per annum in the euro area over this period. These estimates suggests that in the 
absence of tightening measures the euro area economy would have expanded by 2.3- 2.6% last year, 
and would be expected to grow by 0.8- 1.3% in 2012.  
Figure 11: Impact on GDP Growth in the Euro Area 
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Figure 12: Impact on Government Budget Balance (% of GDP) in the Euro Area 
 
Figure 13: Impact on Current Account Balance (% of GDP) in the Euro Area 
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The fiscal position in the euro area as a whole would improve by 2-3% of GDP by 2013. In the forward 
scenario the government budget balance improves slightly more than in the backward scenario, 
reflecting the more moderate declines in GDP growth, a slightly lower rate of unemployment, and the 
impact of the modest decline of government bond yields on government interest liabilities. Much of 
this improvement in government balances is reflected in the current account balance, which is expected 
to improve by more than 1% of GDP by 2013 compared to where it would have been in the absence of 
fiscal tightening across Europe.  
OFCE have developed a small model which accounts for the ‘direct impact’ of fiscal policy on the basis 
of domestic multipliers (close to 1 for the larger economies and to 0.6 for smaller economies), and for 
the indirect effect via external trade. These multipliers are close to the results implied in the NiGEM 
model backward scenario. When applied to their much larger estimate of discretionary fiscal policy, 
shown in Table 2, this model would suggest an even larger negative impact on GDP of fiscal policy in 
the euro area. The impact on Euro Area growth will be of -2 percentage points of growth in 2011, 12, 13. 
The government deficit will improve ex post by 2.7 percent of GDP and the debt ratio would increase 
by 1 percentage point (due to the output GDP) 
9 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BANKING RECAPITALISATION AND 
FINANCIAL UNCERTAINTY 
9.1 Banking Recapitalisation 
As a result of the heightened uncertainty concerning the financial strength of a number of euro zone 
economies (Ireland, Greece and Portugal) over the summer there was an upward drift in risk premia. 
While confined initially to Ireland, Greece and Portugal, in the late summer Spain and Italy began to 
come under pressure followed by a range of other euro zone members. The fall in the market value of 
sovereign bonds from these countries began to impact the balance sheets of individual banks. In turn, 
this created an uncertain environment for all banks in Europe, leading to a dramatic drop in liquidity. 
Banks became increasingly unwilling to lend to each other and the ECB had to step in with additional 
funding to support bank lending and liquidity in euro area money markets4. Related to the provision of 
liquidity by the ECB was a rise in deposits with the ECB as banks preferred the security of the ECB to 
perceived riskier lending to other European banks. Bank deposits with the ECB increased during the 
last quarter of 2011 and reached record levels in early 2012 reflecting the heightened tensions in 
interbank markets. 
The concerns about European banks exposure to sovereign debt led to a new round of stress tests of all 
major European banks. These stress tests were undertaken using valuations as of the end of September. 
                                                     
4 On 8th December 2011, the ECB announced that it would conduct two longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with a 
maturity of three years. The ECB extended €489 billion to banks in the first of the three year liquidity auctions held on 21st 
December.   
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(It should be noted that there was a substantial further rise in Italian and Spanish bond yields after that 
date which was not taken into account in the stress tests, as illustrated in figure 14. This will put 
additional pressure on bank balance sheets and their appetite for lending.) The final results of this 
exercise were announced in early December. It suggested that a range of banks across a range of 
countries needed further capital to take account of this revaluation. Details are set out in Table 4. 
Figure 14: 10-year Yields on Spanish and Italian Government Bonds 
 
 
Table 4: Aggregate Capital Shortfall of Banks, by country, € million 
Austria 3,923 
Belgium 6,313 
Cyprus 3,531 
Germany 13,107 
Spain 26,170 
France 7,324 
Greece 30,000 
Italy 15,366 
Netherlands 159 
Norway 1,520 
Portugal 6,950 
Slovenia 320 
Total 114,685 
Source: EBA (2011) 
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The effect of this assessment is that the banks with shortfalls must raise additional capital by the 
middle of 2012. The total shortfall of €114.7 million is approximately 0.4% of the total bank asset base in 
the euro area. For this to be recovered by June 2012, margins would have to rise by 0.8 percentage 
points for 2 quarters. In our ‘upside’ forecast scenario presented in this report, we assume that this 
minimal capital recovery is effected where necessary, without any additional spillovers to banks that 
do not face direct exposure to the losses.  
However, while the direct exposure only affects some banks in Europe, all banks are conscious of the 
fact that at today’s valuations the shortfall might be larger and might affect more banks. Even banks 
that are reasonably well capitalised are aware that a further recession in Europe could erode their 
capital base. The result is that all banks are made more cautious, and this constitutes the assumption 
underlying our central forecast scenario presented in this report. 
For banks that have to raise capital the implication is that the value of existing shareholders’ 
investment in those banks will be substantially downgraded. The capital loss of shareholders from this 
necessary recapitalisation will be high as a percentage of the original value of their shareholding and 
this prospect must affect their views on the policies pursued by their banks over the coming months. 
All additional loans issued between now and mid-2012 will further enhance the capital requirements of 
the relevant banks. As indicated above the cost of replacing this capital will be very high for the 
shareholders. Thus the option value on not giving a loan is very high, much higher than the interest 
that would be paid on those new loans. The effect of this will be that, for the banks affected, the most 
profitable way of meeting the recapitalisation requirement will be first to issue no new loans and then 
to contract the size of the balance sheet by selling more peripheral assets. The net result will be that 
such banks will prefer to offer no credit to borrowers till after the middle of 2012. 
Because many of the banks affected provide banking services beyond their national frontier this credit 
squeeze will spread well beyond the countries listed in Table 4. This issue is of particular importance in 
countries such as Estonia, Poland and Hungary where the domestically owned banking system is small 
or non-existent. This is one of the costs of the gradual renationalisation of banking services over the 
course of the current crisis (Barrell, Fic, Fitz Gerald, Orazgani & Whitworth, 2011). There has been some 
explicit recognition of this problem with indications that banks will give preference to providing credit 
in their home markets rather than in foreign markets. 
Because of the extreme uncertainty of the current situation for the European financial system this 
pattern of behaviour is likely to affect banks that are currently recognised as being adequately funded. 
This will further aggravate the credit squeeze in the first half of 2012. 
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9.2 Macro-economic Effects 
Modelling the effects of credit rationing poses difficulties and instead we proxy the squeeze on lending 
through a substantial rise in risk premia affecting the cost of credit. In a sense this is the shadow price 
of the constraint on credit. As discussed above we see this credit squeeze affecting most of the EU 
economy because of the integration of the financial system. Thus the risk premium is increased for all 
27 EU countries. 
It is impossible to quantify the precise impact of the recapitalisation requirement on risk premia. As a 
result, the scenario which we present here is just that – a scenario. However, it does illustrate the 
potential importance of this decision to recapitalise the banks over a six month period to the middle of 
2012. 
We implement this stylised shock for all EU countries, which entails a rise in the shadow price of credit 
of 240 basis points for the first two quarters of 2012, returning to baseline in the third quarter.  On top 
of this, we increase credit constraints on consumers by increasing the short-term income elasticity of 
consumption in all EU countries by 0.5 in the first half of 2012. The effects on growth of this shock are 
reported in table 5 below. Euro area GDP falls by 0.8% in 2012. This lost output is partially recovered in 
2013, as we assume bank conditions revert to ‘normal’ in the second half of 2012. Consumer spending 
also falls by 0.8% in 2012, whereas investment in the euro area is down by 4.5%. The impact on 
investment is especially severe, given the dependence of the company sector on external funding and 
also because of the importance of credit to fund private investment in housing. Much of the lost 
investment is recovered in 2013, whereas the household sector recovers more gradually. We would 
expect the shock to raise the unemployment rate by 0.3 percentage points in the euro area this year, and 
worsen aggregate public finances by 0.4% of GDP. The current account balance would be expected to 
improve somewhat, as imports decline and a depreciation of the exchange rate supports external 
demand. 
Table 5: Impact of bank recapitalisation on the Euro Area 
 Percentage point difference from the base 
2012 2013 
GDP growth -0.8 0.3 
Consumer spending growth -0.8 0.1 
Private investment growth -4.5 3.2 
Inflation Rate (Harmonised) 0.0 -0.4 
Unemployment Rate 0.3 0.1 
Govt. Balance as % of GDP -0.4 -0.3 
Current account balance as % of GDP 0.5 0.2 
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11 APPENDIX: FORECAST TABLES 
Annex Table 1: Summary of Key Forecast Indicators for Euro Area 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Output Growth Rate 3.0 0.3 -4.2 1.8 1.7 0.0 1.4 
Inflation Rate (Harmonised) 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.6 1.8 1.4 
Unemployment Rate 7.6 7.7 9.6 10.1 10.1 10.5 10.2 
Govt. Balance as % of GDP -0.7 -2 -6.3 -6.0 -4.2 -3.3 -3.1 
 
Annex Table 2: Euro Area Forecast Details 
 Annual percentage change 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Consumption 1.7 0.3 -1.1 0.9 0.3 -0.3 1.1 
Private investment 5.0 -1.5 -13.9 -0.6 2.8 -2.5 4.5 
Government expenditure 2.2 2.1 2.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.5 0.5 
Stockbuilding 0.3 -0.1 -0.8 0.6 0.2 -0.2 0.1 
Total domestic demand 2.7 0.3 -3.5 1.0 0.8 -0.9 1.7 
Export volumes 6.7 0.8 -12.8 10.9 6.5 2.6 5.9 
Import volumes 6.2 0.7 -11.6 9.1 4.6 0.9 7.1 
GDP growth 3.0 0.3 -4.2 1.8 1.7 0.0 1.4 
Average earnings 2.1 2.9 2.1 0.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Harmonised consumer prices 2.1 3.3 0.3 1.6 2.6 1.8 1.4 
Private consumption deflator 2.2 2.7 -0.4 1.7 2.4 1.9 1.4 
Real personal disposable income 1.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 -0.8 -0.3 0.7 
Standardised unemployment rate, % 7.6 7.7 9.6 10.1 10.1 10.5 10.2 
Govt. balance as % of GDP -0.7 -2.0 -6.3 -6.0 -4.2 -3.3 -3.1 
Govt. debt as % of GDP 66.2 69.9 79.3 85.1 87.9 89.6 89.5 
Current account balance as % of GDP 0.1 -1.6 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 2.0 1.3 
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Annex Table 3: Real GDP in Major Economies 
 Annual percentage change 
World OECD China EU-27 Euro 
Area 
USA Japan German
y 
France Italy UK 
2007 5.4 2.8 13.2 3.2 3.0 1.9 2.3 3.4 2.2 1.4 3.5 
2008 2.8 0.2 9.3 0.2 0.3 -0.3 -1.2 0.8 -0.2 -1.3 -1.1 
2009 -0.7 -3.9 8.9 -4.2 -4.2 -3.5 -6.3 -5.1 -2.6 -5.2 -4.4 
2010 5.1 3.0 10.4 1.9 1.8 3.0 4.1 3.6 1.4 1.2 2.1 
2011 4.0 1.6 9.1 1.7 1.7 1.8 -0.1 3.0 1.7 0.8 1.0 
2012 3.7 1.3 8.5 0.4 0.0 1.5 2.1 0.5 -0.3 -0.7 0.2 
2013 4.3 2.4 8.6 1.8 1.4 2.5 2.1 2.0 1.7 -0.1 2.3 
 
Annex Table 4: Private Consumption Deflator in Major Economies 
 Annual percentage change 
OECD EU-15 Euro Area USA Japan Germany France Italy UK 
2007 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.7 -0.6 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.6 
2008 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.3 0.4 1.7 3.0 3.2 3.5 
2009 0.3 0.0 -0.4 0.2 -2.1 0.1 -0.6 0.0 1.4 
2010 1.7 2.1 1.7 1.8 -1.6 1.9 1.2 1.5 4.1 
2011 2.4 3.0 2.4 2.5 -1.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 4.5 
2012 1.9 2.3 1.9 2.1 -0.7 1.8 1.5 2.1 2.2 
2013 1.6 2.1 1.4 2.0 -0.2 2.1 1.1 1.1 1.6 
 
Annex Table 5: World Trade Volume and Prices 
 Annual percentage change 
World trade volume World export prices ($) Oil price($ per barrel) 
2007 7.4 5.9 70.5 
2008 2.8 5.1 95.7 
2009 -10.8 -7.9 61.8 
2010 12.2 1.2 78.8 
2011 6.6 4.8 108.3 
2012 4.3 0.3 102.8 
2013 7.9 1.7 104.8 
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Annex Table 6: Interest Rates 
 
Per cent per annum 
Central Bank Intervention Rates (% annum) Long-term Interest Rates (% per annum) 
USA Japan Euro Area UK USA Japan Euro Area UK 
2007 5.1 0.5 3.8 5.5 4.6 1.7 4.3 5.0 
2008 2.1 0.5 3.9 4.7 3.6 1.5 4.3 4.5 
2009 0.3 0.1 1.3 0.6 3.2 1.3 3.8 3.7 
2010 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.5 3.2 1.2 3.5 3.6 
2011 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.5 2.8 1.1 4.0 3.1 
2012 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.5 2.2 1.0 4.2 2.4 
2013 0.5 0.2 1.1 0.5 2.6 1.1 4.1 2.5 
2010Q1 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.5 3.7 1.3 3.7 4.1 
2010Q2 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.5 3.5 1.3 3.5 3.7 
2010Q3 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.5 2.8 1.0 3.3 3.2 
2010Q4 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.5 2.9 1.0 3.6 3.3 
2011Q1 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.5 3.4 1.2 4.1 3.7 
2011Q2 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.5 3.2 1.2 3.9 3.4 
2011Q3 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.5 2.4 1.0 3.8 2.8 
2011Q4 0.3 0.1 1.3 0.5 2.1 1.0 4.0 2.3 
2012Q1 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.5 2.1 1.0 4.1 2.3 
2012Q2 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.5 2.2 1.0 4.2 2.3 
2012Q3 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.5 2.3 1.0 4.2 2.4 
2012Q4 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.5 2.4 1.1 4.1 2.4 
2013Q1 0.4 0.2 1.0 0.5 2.4 1.1 4.1 2.4 
2013Q2 0.4 0.2 1.1 0.5 2.5 1.1 4.1 2.5 
2013Q3 0.5 0.2 1.2 0.5 2.6 1.1 4.1 2.5 
2013Q4 0.6 0.2 1.4 0.6 2.7 1.1 4.1 2.6 
 
Annex Table 7: Nominal Exchange Rates 
 Annual percentage change 
USA Japan Euro Area Germany France Italy UK 
2007 -4.6 -4.7 3.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.1 
2008 -2.0 12.9 5.1 2.0 2.6 2.5 -11.8 
2009 7.0 15.5 6.0 2.4 1.7 2.4 -10.6 
2010 -3.1 4.6 -6.1 -3.6 -2.8 -3.2 -0.2 
2011 -3.0 7.1 1.8 0.5 1.0 1.2 -0.3 
2012 4.5 5.1 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.1 
2013 0.9 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.9 
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Annex Table 8: Bilateral Exchange Rates 
 Bilateral rate against US$ 
Yen Euro Sterling 
2007 117.8 0.731 0.500 
2008 103.4 0.683 0.544 
2009 93.6 0.72 0.641 
2010 87.8 0.755 0.647 
2011 79.9 0.719 0.625 
2012 78.1 0.748 0.642 
2013 78.6 0.75 0.640 
2010Q1 90.7 0.722 0.642 
2010Q2 92.0 0.787 0.671 
2010Q3 85.8 0.775 0.645 
2010Q4 82.6 0.736 0.632 
2011Q1 82.3 0.732 0.624 
2011Q2 81.7 0.695 0.614 
2011Q3 77.7 0.709 0.621 
2011Q4 77.8 0.740 0.640 
2012Q1 77.8 0.740 0.650 
2012Q2 78.0 0.750 0.640 
2012Q3 78.4 0.750 0.640 
2012Q4 78.4 0.750 0.640 
2013Q1 78.6 0.750 0.640 
2013Q2 78.6 0.750 0.640 
2013Q3 78.6 0.750 0.640 
2013Q4 78.6 0.750 0.640 
 
